Crypto: Essential Tips for Developers to Protect Their Computers and Wallets

A job interview, a file to open, an emptied treasury. The Security Alliance (SEAL), a non-profit organization focused on crypto security founded in the wake of researcher samczsun, has published a repository dedicated to intrusions specifically targeting developers. The document does not originate from a lab: it compiles attack patterns observed during emergency interventions carried out by its incident response teams. The starting point is uncomfortable for the entire industry. The weak link in a protocol is no longer in its code, but in front of the screen of the person writing it.

Key Points {#h-key-points}

• SEAL, the crypto security alliance founded in the wake of samczsun, publishes a repository of intrusions targeting developers, built on its real incident response cases.
• Attacks are no longer aimed at smart contracts but at workstations: Bybit ($1.5 billion) and Radiant Capital ($50 million) were compromised through developers' machines.
• Fake recruiters, trapped technical exercises, fake Zoom updates, ClickFix techniques, and hijacked npm packages make up the bulk of the documented attack chains.
• Segregation of signing machines, pinned dependencies, clear signing, and out-of-band verification of interlocutors are among the recommended countermeasures.

When the Developer's Computer Becomes the Entry Point {#h-when-the-developer-s-computer-becomes-the-entry-point}

Audits, reward programs, and code reviews make certain attacks against smart contracts more difficult. Therefore, hackers are seeking other paths. They particularly target individuals capable of modifying a site, publishing an update, or signing a significant transaction.

The $1.5 billion theft suffered by Bybit in February 2025 remains the most spectacular example. The contracts of the multi-signature wallet were not directly hacked. The attacker had compromised the computer of a developer from Safe{Wallet}, the service used to prepare transactions.

Malicious code then modified the interface presented to Bybit's signers. They thought they were approving a regular transfer, while the transaction actually signed gave the attacker control of the cold wallet. The FBI attributed the operation to the North Korean group TraderTraitor.

Radiant Capital had suffered a comparable attack a few months earlier, for about $50 million. Several developers received an archive on Telegram presented as a PDF document, sent from the account of a former contractor considered reliable. The file installed malware on their computers.

The interface then displayed seemingly normal transactions, while hardware wallets received something else to sign. In other words, the cryptographic protections still worked, but the information shown to users had been falsified.

From Fake Recruitment to Trapped Programs {#h-from-fake-recruitment-to-trapped-programs}

The first contact usually takes a mundane form: a job offer, a paid mission, a request for help, or a report signaling a supposed vulnerability. The conversation ends with an invitation to download a file, open a project, or execute a command.

SEAL distinguishes several frequent steps in its reference document:

• Initial Contact: A fake recruiter or entrepreneur approaches their target on LinkedIn, Telegram, or Discord.
• Delivery of the Trap: The victim receives a GitHub deposit, an archive, an extension, or a technical exercise.
• Installation: The code executes when launching a test, installing a dependency, or during a fake update of Zoom or Teams.
• Theft: The software retrieves passwords, open sessions, access to cloud services, or information to prepare a fraudulent transaction.

The so-called ClickFix technique even encourages the victim to perform the installation themselves. A fake error message asks them to copy a command into their terminal to resolve a fictitious problem.

The libraries used by developers are another target. In September 2025, the account of a maintainer of several very popular npm packages, including chalk and debug, was compromised by a fake two-factor authentication reset email. Code intended to divert crypto transactions was then added to 18 packages totaling over two billion weekly downloads.

Isolating Code Before Trusting It {#h-isoler-le-code-avant-de-lui-faire-confiance}

SEAL's main recommendation is to consider all external code as dangerous until reviewed. Even a project passed on by an acquaintance may have been altered, while that person's account could have been hacked.

An unknown file or repository should therefore be opened in a virtual machine or a temporary environment that contains no passwords, wallets, or access to production systems. Once the analysis is complete, this environment can be deleted.

SEAL also advises to reserve a computer for sensitive signatures, freeze dependency versions, and wait before installing a recently released update. The identity of an unexpected contact should be verified through another channel, such as a call to a known number.

These precautions also apply to AI-based programming assistants. An agent capable of reading a project and then automatically executing its instructions should be placed in the same isolated environment as the code it analyzes.

Finally, teams should prepare their crisis procedure before an incident: knowing who can suspend a service, notify exchange platforms, or communicate publicly. SEAL 911 provides free assistance, available at all times, thanks to a network of volunteer researchers.

The guide's message ultimately boils down to one rule: opening an unknown project is not always a passive operation. As soon as a tool installs, interprets, or executes its content, this simple file can become an open door to the entire infrastructure. More than ever within a company or project, the security of all depends on the behavior of each individual.

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